T
he 2012 multistate fungal meningitis outbreak caused by contaminated injectable methylprednisolone manufactured by New England Compounding Center (NECC) has raised concerns about the quality of compounded drugs. 1 Within two months of initially detecting the outbreak, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and state health agencies identified 490 patients with serious fungal infection, including meningitis, stroke, other infection related to the central nervous system (n = 478), and joint infection (n = 12); 34 patients had died, and the outbreak involved 19 states. 2 CDC estimated that approximately 14,000 patients received injections from three lots of methylprednisolone. 2 The number of patients exposed to this contaminated compounded drug is unprecedented, the clinical consequences are severe, and many of the affected patients who survived will undergo additional invasive procedures and treatments. 3 This scenario is unusual but may only be the tip of the iceberg.
Under the traditional definition of pharmacy compounding, a pharmacist compounds a medication for a single patient after receiving a prescription written by a single clinician. 4 Traditional compound-Am J Health-Syst Pharm-Vol 70 ing practices are regulated by state boards of pharmacy to meet the needs of patients not served by medications with Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved labeling. Compounding pharmacies are not required to establish efficacy and safety, obtain FDA approval, or comply with manufacturing and labeling standards for compounded drugs. 5 In contrast, drug manufacturers are regulated by FDA and must comply with good manufacturing practices. Over the past few decades, the regulatory gap between state regulation of traditional compounding practices and FDA regulation of drug manufacturing has allowed the proliferation of compounding pharmacies that distribute large quantities of compounded sterile products nationwide. According to the International Academy of Compounding Pharmacists, 1-3% of all prescriptions in the United States are compounded. 6 An estimated 7500 pharmacies in the United States provide advanced compounding services, 3000 of which provide sterile compounding services. 6 Only about 2% of compounding pharmacies participate in the industry's voluntary accreditation program. 5 Since 2000, FDA has issued numerous warnings about the quality of compounded drugs, 1 including problems with potency [7] [8] [9] [10] and sterility 11 and the presence of particulates 12, 13 or contaminants. 14, 15 In 2001 and 2006, FDA investigators found that 30% of the compounded drug samples they tested contained either too little or too much of the active ingredient, 16, 17 compared with less than 2% of FDA-approved prescription drugs. 16 In the past, potential outbreaks have been averted before compounded drugs reached large numbers of patients. 18 In 2003, a compounding pharmacy that specialized in respiratory drugs issued a partial recall of two batches of albuterol-ipratropium respiratory solution (more than 1 million doses) that were contaminated with Burkholderia cepacia. 11 A full recall was issued after the Missouri Board of Pharmacy obtained a restraining order to halt further dispensing of contaminated respiratory solutions. More than 19,000 patients throughout the United States may have been exposed to the contaminated drug, but no known infections resulted from this event.
We questioned whether infectious outbreaks associated with contaminated compounded drugs are a new or recurring problem and whether there are features associated with compounded drugs or surveillance systems that may hinder outbreak detection. Outbreak detection requires that a person or automated system recognizes unusual events and that systems are in place to enable reporting and investigation. Therefore, the objectives of this analysis were to describe features of infectious outbreaks associated with exposure to contaminated drugs produced by compounding pharmacies outside the hospital setting, sterile compounding procedures associated with microbial contamination, and outbreak features relevant for detection and investigation. 20 This additional search was necessary to query for additional outbreaks and to obtain additional information about previously identified outbreaks.
Methods
The analysis focused on infectious outbreaks in the United States that resulted from exposure to drugs that were likely contaminated during production by a compounding pharmacy and was limited to compounding pharmacies that prepared sterile products outside the hospital setting.
After identifying an outbreak that met the selection criteria, information (in order of precedence if content differed between sources) from government publications (including FDA Enforcement Letters and recall notices), peer-reviewed literature, congressional testimony, and meeting abstracts was extracted. The information was used to describe the (1) triggers that led to outbreak detection, (2) number and location of patients involved, (3) drug name and route of administration, (4) infectious organisms and clinical outcomes, (5) name and location of the compounding pharmacy, and (6) findings from the investigation. For one outbreak, the publication indicated that patients were located in seven states but the states were not identified. We assumed that the seven state public health officials that authored the report represented the states where patients were identified.
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Results
A total of 12 outbreaksincluding the most recent outbreak associated with NECC-met the inclusion criteria (Table 1) . Am J Health-Syst Pharm-Vol 70 These outbreaks specifically involved pharmacies that compound drugs outside of the hospital setting. No single source provided information about all 12 outbreaks. Ten of the eligible outbreaks were identified using PubMed (6 were reported in peer-reviewed journals, 2 in MMWR, and 2 in both MMWR and a peer-reviewed journal). Two additional outbreaks were identified from EIS meeting abstracts (outbreaks 7 and 9). Information about five of the pharmacies involved in the identified outbreaks were listed on the FDA Pharmacy Compounding webpage as of November 28, 2012 (outbreaks 4, 7, and 9-11). Information about outbreak 12, the NECC multistate fungal meningitis outbreak, was readily available on the FDA site. Once we identified the names of pharmacies involved, we found additional documents about 9 of the outbreaks using the FDA website search engine (outbreaks 2, 4-7, and 9-12). The outbreaks identified were investigated by state or federal public health authorities or both.
Outbreak descriptions. Between January 2000 and before the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak associated with NECC, 11 outbreaks were identified, involving 207 infected patients and 17 deaths after exposure to contaminated compounded drugs ( Table 1 ). The overall case fatality rate was 8.2%. When the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak was included, the totals increased almost fivefold (as of March 9, 2013) , to 927 infected patients with 65 deaths (case fatality rate: 7%).
Including the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak, the 12 outbreaks were associated with 13 drugs ( (Table 1) . For example, in the outbreak of bloodstream infections caused by P. fluorescens, 59% of the 80 patients developed symptoms within 24 hours after exposure to contaminated heparinized 0.9% sodium chloride injection flush solution, while the remaining 41% were diagnosed 84-421 days after the last potential exposure to a contaminated flush. 30 Delayed onset of symptoms and recognition of infection were also observed in the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak.
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Among the 65 patients who died in all 12 outbreaks (as of March 9, 2013) , at least 38 died of meningitis (and 14 others died from meningitis or other causes 51 ) after epidural injections of betamethasone or methylprednisolone, 10 died of bloodstream infections after i.v. administration of magnesium sulfate or total parenteral nutrition, and 3 died of systemic inflammatory response syndrome after the administration of a cardioplegia solution during coronary artery bypass-graft surgery. The case-fatality rate varied by route of administration, ranging from 27% for patients who received contaminated cardioplegia solution during heart surgery, to 7.8% for drugs administered intravenously, to 7.0% for epidurally or intraarticularly administered drugs.
Of the 51 case-patients who developed endophthalmitis after exposure to contaminated trypan blue or brilliant blue G during ophthalmic surgery or intravitreal injection of bevacizumab or triamcinolone, none died. However, 80-83% of patients with endophthalmitis required repeat surgery (in outbreaks 10 and 11) or experienced high rates of vision loss (77-100% in the three outbreaks), and 5 patients (10%) underwent evisceration or enucleation of the affected eye.
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Implicated pharmacies and practices. Drugs involved in the outbreaks were compounded by 12 pharmacies located in 10 states throughout the United States (Table 1) . Two thirds (n = 8) of the outbreaks involved patients exposed to drugs compounded by a pharmacy located in a different state other than the patient's residence or location of care ( Figure 1) , and half involved patients identified in multiple states. In only 3 outbreaks, the compounding pharmacy and patients were located in the same state. One additional outbreak (outbreak 6) was likely limited to one state, but the location of the patients was not provided. 35 A source of contamination at the implicated pharmacy was not established in 5 outbreaks. However, the remaining investigations uncovered The presence of preservatives in the drug was not indicated in the literature for the first nine outbreaks. FDA = Food and Drug Administration. Patients with ophthalmic conditions who received drug by the conjunctival route did not get infected; these patients also received gentamicin prophylaxis. c Information about outbreak was not found on FDA website. Eighteen case-patients were identified in the cluster reported by Susenshine et al. 28, 29 In the FDA investigation report, an additional patient died and was reported in another state. a myriad of problems, including improper autoclave performance or failure to follow autoclave procedures, no sterility testing of the finished product, inadequate cleanroom or environmental sampling practices, failure to follow recommended filter-sterilization processes, and inadequate staff training and quality-assurance processes. After investigation, sterility could not be ensured for any products from the compounding facilities associated with 6 (50%) of the 12 outbreaks, leading to a recall of all of the companies' sterile products (outbreaks 1, 2, 7, 9, 11, and 12).
Outbreak detection. Scenarios that led to the initial recognition of these outbreaks varied (Table 1) . In 2 outbreaks (outbreaks 2 and 12), an astute clinician or laboratory worker reported one or two cases of rare infections that triggered active surveillance and a public health response. The remaining outbreaks were identified only when a cluster of patients from a common hospital or clinic presented with similar clinical characteristics to a common setting. The 2005 outbreak of S. marcescens bloodstream infections was independently detected in two states simultaneously. Investigation of the 2012 outbreak of fungal endophthalmitis associated with brilliant blue G led to the detection of a second contaminated drug (intravitreal triamcinolone) from the same compounding pharmacy associated with additional patients.
Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the first systematic summary of infectious outbreaks associated with drugs compounded by pharmacies outside of the hospital setting. The reported infectious outbreaks were severe, and half involved patients in multiple states. The 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak was the largest; however, the morbidity and mortality rates were similar to those of earlier outbreaks. Patients lost their vision; required hospitalization, surgeries, or treatments; and about 7% died. Each outbreak illustrated one or more root causes that could have been addressed with preventive policies and practices (Table 2 ). In particular, the literature described lapses in recommended processes for producing sterile compounded drugs and evidence that clinicians were sometimes unaware they were using compounded drugs. This lack of awareness may obfuscate links between adverse events and compounded drugs and lead to underrecognition and underreporting of problems. No single source included information about all of the outbreaks identified. Several of the outbreaks involved suspensions or solutions that were reported to be preservative-free or were likely preservative-free, including methylprednisolone suspension (preservative status unknown; outbreak 2), preservative-free bevacizumab solution (outbreak 10), preservative-free triamcinolone (probably a suspension; outbreak 11), and preservative-free methylprednisolone suspension (outbreak 12). Although initial publications about the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak reported that the methylprednisolone used was a solution, congression al documents later identified it as a suspension. 52, 53 The betamethasone formulation in outbreak 1 was also likely a suspension, because it was compounded to replace an FDAapproved injectable betamethasone suspension that was not available at the time. Some compounding pharmacies market preservative-free corticosteroids for epidural injection as an alternative to FDA-approved products that contain a preservative. The rationale is that preservative-free formulations may avoid potential neurotoxicity (aseptic meningitis, arachnoiditis). Compounded drugs are also sometimes favored because of their lower costs and ready availability during shortages of commercial products. 5, 30 Clinicians who use compounded preservative-free solutions and suspensions need to weigh the risks and benefits of these competing concerns.
Compounded sterile products that are preservative-free have a high risk of microbial contamination if the standards established in the United States Pharmacopeia (USP) for the compounding of sterile preparations (chapter 797) are not strictly followed. 58 Sterile suspensions may have a high risk of microbial contamination if inappropriate sterilization methods are used. Sterilization of suspensions by heat may not adequately remove pyrogens and fungal contaminants. 59 Likewise, sterilization by filtration may be problematic, as suspensions can clog a 0.2-mm filter. Some experts recommend against the use of compounded injectable corticosteroid suspensions on the basis that sterilization methods avail-able to compounding pharmacies are inadequate. 59 In outbreak 10, single-dose vials of preservative-free bevacizumab solution were repackaged into multiple 0.1-mL syringes for multiple patients. Some endophthalmitis outbreaks associated with compounded bevacizumab have been linked to poor aseptic technique and nonadherence to requirements for the safe repackaging of single-dose vials outlined in USP chapter 797. 12 CDC has taken the position that single-dose vials should only be used for one patient and advises that repackaging of unopened single-dose vials for multiple patients should only occur in times of critical need and should be performed in accordance with USP chapter 797. 60 The outbreaks identified in the literature were those that were investigated and reported by public health authorities after they were identified by clinicians. Investigations of reported outbreaks associated with the administration of compounded drugs were triggered when the outbreaks were associated with a cluster of unusual infections (e.g., postprocedural endophthalmitis) or when the identified organism was somehow atypical (rarely causes infection or was cultured from an unexpected site). For example, the initial report of a patient with culture-confirmed Aspergillus fumigatus meningitis 46 days after receiving an epidural steroid injection was sufficient to trigger active surveillance and led to the rapid recognition of additional patients with similar exposures. 53 This finding heralded the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak. 53 Outbreaks may be more difficult to detect when exposures and case-patients are scattered geographically or when clinical outcomes are less severe and patients have underlying conditions or treatments that could explain their outcomes. For example, even perceptive clinicians may miss compounded drugs as a source in common and expected infections, such as with central-line-associated bloodstream infections (e.g., S. marcescens sepsis in patients receiving total parenteral nutrition or magnesium sulfate). Lack of clinician awareness that patients even received a compounded product can be a factor that delays, or prevents, the recognition of the source of an outbreak. For example, in the S. marcescens bloodstream infections outbreak after cardiac surgery, neither of the hospital pharmacies was aware that the product was compounded, as "there was no specific indication on the package labeling, and the company's website did not specify that the product was compounded." 28 In addition, redistribution of products from a compounding pharmacy before delivery to the final customer may limit the recognition of the potential role of compounded drugs in an infectious outbreak. For example, in the P. fluorescens bloodstream infection outbreak, a company employed a compounding pharmacy to make a concentrated heparin solution, which was then diluted and repackaged to make heparinized 0.9% sodium chloride injection flush syringes. 30 These syringes were "sold to distributors who redistributed to other medical distributors and hospitals." 61 Such redistribution can blur the recognition of a common source.
To identify and link unusual infections across settings, there is a need for robust surveillance systems that support detection and reporting. Existing systems have limitations. First, communicable disease and injury reporting systems that require reporting of selected diseases and conditions to public health departments 62 may capture events, but underreporting is common. 63, 64 In addition, the types of infections associated with contaminated compounded drugs would rely on general reporting requirements, such as " [Report] any unusual occurrence of infectious or communicable disease." 65 Even when providers recognize and consider reporting unusual events, they can be stymied by concerns about potential violations of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. Second, CDC's National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) includes a patient safety component, but this component would be unlikely to detect events from compounded drugs, because it focuses on the surveillance of (1) infections associated with devices or common procedures or multidrugresistant organisms and (2) events associated with dialysis and blood products. 66 NHSN is not designed to address surveillance of sporadic adverse drug events in outpatient settings and does not provide real-time reporting.
Our analysis focused on compounding pharmacies in the community rather than pharmacies that compound drugs in the hospital setting, because the former may present unique public health risks. The large scale of production and multistate distribution of products from sterile compounding pharmacies may contribute to the size of outbreaks when they occur. In the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak associated with NECC, approximately 17,600 doses of methylprednisolone were shipped to 76 facilities in 23 states, and an estimated 14,000 patients were exposed. 52 As the outbreak progressed, more than 4,000 drugs made by NECC and its sister company, Ameridose, were voluntarily recalled. The volume of recalled drugs was large enough to exacerbate drug shortages. 67 The size of these companies does not appear to be an anom-aly. Central Admixture Pharmacy Services (outbreak 7) reports making 300,000 deliveries of i.v. admixtures each year. 68 PharMEDium (outbreak 4) employs over 700 people and provides sterile compounding services to over 1,800 hospitals in 49 states. 28, 69 This study did have limitations. In particular, the strategy used to identify outbreaks missed outbreaks not reported in the literature or investigated by FDA or CDC. For example, an EpiNotes publication by the North Carolina Department of Health commented on two patients who developed Chryseomonas meningitis from compounded epidural methylprednisolone in 2001, but the details are unpublished. 24 We recommend addressing the root causes identified in these outbreaks, including the regulatory gaps, compounding processes, awareness among clinicians, and the public health systems required to monitor compounding practices and identify and respond to outbreaks (Table 2) . Compounding pharmacies should fully comply with USP chapter 797, the standard for sterile compounding safety in the United States. 58, 70 In 2011, state regulations had not consistently adopted USP chapter 797 as the standard for sterile compounding in their jurisdiction, 71 and compliance among compounding pharmacies was found to be 72% among 1148 respondents from hospital settings and 82% among a limited sample of 40 respondents from community pharmacy settings. 72 In addition, electronic health record systems should be enhanced to recognize links between compounded drugs and infections. This would require improvements in (1) real-time processing of triggers for unusual organisms, unusual organism or specimen source combinations, or rare diagnoses (e.g., endophthalmitis), (2) coding of compounded drugs in the electronic health record to identify compounded drugs, and (3) sharing of laboratory results not explicitly defined in public health communicable disease reporting rules but indicative of unusual infections.
Conclusion
Before the nationwide 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak associated with NECC, drugs produced by compounding pharmacies were associated with 11 other outbreaks that occurred sporadically over the past 12 years. Lapses in sterile compounding procedures led to contamination of compounded drugs, exposure to patients, and a threat to public health in these outbreaks. Recognition and subsequent public health investigation were usually triggered by the occurrence of illness among multiple patients in a single health care setting.
